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Abstract 
Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent 
misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often threaten the 
overall project viability. This paper investigates the explanations for cost overruns that are 
given in the literature. Overall, four categories of explanations can be distinguished: 
technical, economic, psychological, and political. Political explanations have been seen to be 
the most dominant explanations for cost overruns. Agency theory is considered the most 
interesting for political explanations and an eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-
political explanations are diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories 
(including rational choice theory and prospect theory), depending on the kind of explanation 
is considered more appropriate than one all-embracing theory.  
 
Keywords: cost overruns, explanations, large-scale projects, theoretical embeddedness, 
transportation infrastructure 
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Introduction 
Investments in infrastructure are a considerable burden on a country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). For example, in 2005 the Dutch government invested about 8 billion euros (CBS, 
2005 in KIM, 2007) in infrastructure, amounting to 1.55% of GDP. This is of even greater 
concern if the inefficient allocation of financial resources as the result of decisions based on 
misinformation are recognised (Flyvbjerg, 2005b, De Bruijn and Leijten, 2007). Cost 
estimates are often inaccurate and consequently the ranking of projects based on project 
viability is also inaccurate. Inevitably, this means there is a danger that eventually inferior 
projects are implemented, that resources are used which could have been assigned more 
appropriately, and that projects that are unable to recover their costs are implemented. 
Inaccurate estimates make it particularly difficult to manage large projects and often lead to 
cost overruns, which further increases the burden on the country’s GDP. The problem can be 
summarised as follows: managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult 
due to frequent misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often 
threaten overall project viability. Various studies have addressed the issue of cost overruns in 
transportation projects (van Wee, 2007). Some studies, including a large database of projects, 
reach the following conclusions. The Government Accountability Office, for example, found 
that 77% of highway projects in the USA experienced cost escalation (in Kaliba et al., 2008). 
Merewitz (1973) suggests that the average overrun of infrastructure projects is a little over 50 
percent (Merewitz, 1973). A review by Morris and Hough (1987), which covered about 3500 
projects, revealed that overruns are the norm, and generally range between 40 and 200 per 
cent (Reichelt and Lyneis, 1999). Furthermore, a study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a) indicates 
that in 86 percent of the projects cost overruns appear to overrun by an average of 28 percent.  
The problem is recognised in the literature but the causes and explanations are still 
ambiguous. To the authors’ knowledge, a systematic investigation into the different 
explanations for cost overruns has not yet been conducted. Moreover, insight into the theories 
underlying these explanations has been the subject of only a few studies. A sound theoretical 
basis is particularly important because it substantiates the explanation and provides 
opportunities to define the appropriate cures.  
This paper provides an overview of explanations and their theoretical embeddedness in 
order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of cost overruns  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the research 
methodology, and this is followed in section 3 by a description of the causes and explanations 
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for cost overruns for each source. The explanations are categorised and further examined in 
section 4. Section 5 elaborates on the theoretical embeddedness of the explanations. Finally, 
section 6 presents the main conclusions, addresses the research questions and presents a 
number of recommendations.  
 
Methodology 
In line with the conventional methodology, the inaccuracy of cost estimates is measured as 
the size of cost overruns. Cost overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs minus estimated 
costs as a percentage of estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted 
construction costs determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined 
as budgeted or forecasted construction costs determined at the time of the decision to build. 
Cost estimates become more accurate during the project process. However, what is relevant 
here is the estimate known by the decision maker, i.e. the estimate based upon which the 
decision maker decides whether or not to implement the project. A particular moment in time 
is often taken to represent the moment at which the decision to implement the project was 
made (‘formal decision to build’). Cost overruns are generally calculated according to the 
costs estimated at this ‘formal decision to build’ (these are the costs at the initial funding 
level). However, the decision-making process involves several moments at which decisions 
are made; therefore, references to the formal decision to build do not always provide an 
accurate picture of cost overruns. In some cases, parties have committed themselves at an 
earlier decision-making moment, known as the ‘real decision to build’. This situation is 
referred to as lock-in at the decision-making level. Lock-in influences the magnitude of cost 
overruns, because the estimated costs at the real decision to build are usually lower than those 
at later stages of the decision-making process (Cantarelli et al. 2009). This paper concentrates 
on explanations rather than on causes. In line with the definition in Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), 
what we mean by ‘cause’ is ‘to result in’; the cause is not the explanation of the result. 
Causes refer to the variables or factors that influence the cost overruns, such as the 
implementation period or the size of the project. Explanations are more general and might 
comprise several causes.  
We define transportation infrastructure projects as follows: ‘Transport infrastructures 
include roads, rail lines, channels, (extensions to) airports and harbours, bridges and tunnels. 
Of these projects it is the ‘hardware’ that is considered, and the “software”,i.e. projects 
relating to deregulations, liberalization, privatization, and so forth is excluded’. The literature 
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did not provide one minimum cost level that is generally applied to mark a large-scale 
project. A large-scale project is defined in this paper by a minimum cost level of 500 million 
euros.  
A literature study of explanations and theories that are used to support the explanations 
was carried out. In line with Morris (1990), who concludes in his research that in 
understanding the planning failures, one has to look for a general explanation, the review 
methodology does not set out any restrictions in the search for literature on cost overruns of 
transportation infrastructure projects. It attempts to give an overview of studies that is as 
complete as possible. Studies addressing project performance in general are considered 
(broad focus) as well as studies focusing specifically on cost overruns (narrow focus). Most 
studies are empirical studies; studies that largely use data from observation or experience, i.e. 
empirical studies give insight into the extent of cost overruns based on data from real 
projects. Table 1 presents the different studies.  
Table 1. Overview sources of literature 
 Various categories of projects 
including transport projects 
Transport  
Narrow focus Wachs (1987, 1989) 
Morris (1990) 
Arvan and Leite (1990) 
Kahneman (1993, 2003) 
 
Knudsen (1976) 
Fouracre et al. (1990) 
Pickrell (1992) 
Auditor General of Sweden (1994) 
Mansfield et al. (1994) 
Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997) 
Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) 
Trujillo (2002) 
Odeck (2004) 
Lee (2008) 
Kaliba et al. (2008) 
Broad focus Hall (1980) 
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) 
Szyliowics (1995) 
Bruzelius et al (2003) 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
Mackie and Preston (1998) 
 
Causes and explanations for cost overruns 
Studies with a narrow focus 
Morris (1990) conducted one of the first empirical studies with a narrow focus on cost 
overruns in large projects. He argues that delays in project implementation and cost overruns 
have become a regular feature of public sector projects. The average cost overrun found in 
this study is 82%. As far as possible causes are concerned, Morris (1990) concludes that 
about 20 - 25% can be attributed to price increases, and the remaining 70-75% has to be 
explained in terms of real factors, such as delays in implementation. He gives the following 
main factors as the causes of delays and cost overruns: poor project design and 
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implementation, inadequate funding of projects, bureaucratic indecision, and a lack of 
coordination between enterprises.  
The study by Arvan and Leite (1990) focuses on large-scale government sponsored 
procurement. They provide an explanation of cost overruns by assuming that the sponsor 
cannot pre-commit to the compensation paid to the contractor when the contractor has some 
private cost information.  
Wachs (1987, 1989) reviews several forecasting models in the field of transportation. He 
finds that forecasts are often inaccurate, underestimating costs and overestimating traffic 
demand. He proposes two possible explanations for these optimistic forecasts. Firstly, 
‘forecasting is inherently exact and the observed errors result from imperfect techniques’. 
Secondly, ‘travel and cost forecasting is deliberately slanted to produce figures which 
constitute technical justification for public works programs favoured on the basis of political 
rather than economic or technical criteria’. Because the forecasting errors are always in the 
same direction - always an overestimation of traffic demand and an underestimation of costs - 
the first explanation seems, according to Wachs, to be less valid. In line with Ascher’s 
argumentation (1987) he concludes that ‘the competitive, politically charged environment of 
transportation forecasting has resulted in the continuous adjustment of assumptions until they 
produce forecasts which support politically attractive outcomes’. He identifies three main 
sources of error in forecasting costs: changes of scope, assumed rates of inflation that are 
lower than actual rates of inflation, and delay. He concludes that about 40-90% of the total 
cost overrun can be explained by these factors, but a substantial part remains unexplained. 
Other causes can be found in the funding system commonly found in rail transit projects.  
There is an incentive with this kind of funding system to select the most optimistic 
assumptions in the development of cost estimates for projects.  
A frequently cited piece of research concerned with forecasting in decision-making is by 
the Nobel prize winner Kahneman. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Lovallo and 
Kahneman (2003) identify two main biases in forecasting and risk taking. The first bias 
concerns optimism bias, the systematic tendency to be overly optimistic about the outcome. 
The second bias concerns risk aversion, the overly cautious attitudes towards risk.  
Lastly, a more recent study by Lee (2008) examined cost overruns in Korean social 
overhead capital projects. Based on 161 completed projects he concluded that the causes of 
cost overruns can be grouped into several major categories: changes in scope, delays during 
construction, unreasonable estimation and adjustment of project costs, and no practical use of 
the earned value management system.  
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Various studies addressed cost overruns for transportation projects specifically. For 
example, Pickrell (1992) investigated the cost overruns and benefit shortfalls of 8 rail transit 
projects in the US. In his study, Pickrell (1992) starts from the premise that forecasters 
overestimate rail transit ridership and underestimate rail construction costs and operating 
expenses. To understand these inaccurate forecasts, he points, on the one hand, to optimism 
among local officials and to inadequate planning processes on the other. He argues that the 
causes of underestimated costs lie in the structure of programmes and the existence of 
dedicated funding sources that provide few incentives for local officials to seek accurate 
information for evaluating alternatives. Fouracre et al. (1990) investigated cost overruns for 
21 metro projects worldwide. Nearly all the metro systems incurred costs higher than 
expected. These overruns were attributed to ‘a range of factors, including the additional costs 
of unforeseen service and utility diversions and other civil works problems, which could not 
be offset by contingency allowances; changes in specifications; currency devaluation and 
rises in interest charges’. According to the authors, most of the cost estimates were optimistic 
because there was little appreciation of the difficulties of the work. In addition, authorities 
lacked the management skills to mitigate errors in project planning and to keep effective 
control of costs. 
The Auditor General of Sweden (1994) is another study with a narrow focus on cost 
overruns involving transport projects. It covered 15 road and rail projects. The average 
capital cost overrun for the eight road projects was 86%, ranging between 2 and 182%, and 
for the seven rail projects this was 17%, ranging from minus 14% to plus 74%. The authors 
conclude that there is still a considerable element that cannot be explained by technical 
causes.  
The study by Mansfield et al. (1994) considered the causes of cost overrun in Nigerian 
construction projects specifically (highway projects). They concluded that the major variables 
that can lead to excessive project overruns are the financing of and payment for completed 
works, poor contract management, shortages of materials, price fluctuations, and inaccurate 
estimates leading to delays. Other factors which can be identified as usually being responsible 
for project delays and excessive costs are excessive bureaucratic checking and approval 
procedures, unclear definitions of contract terms by the client and insufficient geotechnical 
investigations at the feasibility stage.  
The research by Skamris and Flyvbjerg (1997) covers seven tunnel and bridge projects. 
They found an average construction cost overrun for the five completed projects of 14%, 
ranging from -10% to 33%.  
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The Dutch study by Nijkamp and Ubbels (1999) also concentrates specifically on the cost 
overruns of transport projects. In contrast to the findings of most studies, they conclude that 
in cost estimates generally tend to be rather reliable. In most projects, cost overruns were 
common but the extent of cost underestimation varied between 0 and 20%. They identify 
three common causes of cost underestimation in projects: price rises, incompleteness of 
estimations and adjustments to the projects. They do not consider the strategic behaviour of 
the actors involved to have a major impact on cost overruns. They tend to argue that change 
in social opinion and intervention by interest groups, the availability of new technologies, the 
state of the economy, and the tendering method all lead to adjustments in the project which 
cause cost overruns.  
A more recent study on cost overruns by Odeck (2004) uses statistical analysis to derive 
the average cost overruns and to identify the factors that influence cost overruns. The average 
cost overrun found in this study is rather small at around 7.9%. A striking feature is the large 
standard deviation – 29.2% – indicating a large spread around this average among the 
individual projects. Surprisingly, the cost overrun percentage seems to be higher for smaller 
projects compared with larger ones. (However, the number of large projects is small 
compared with the number of smaller projects.) Regarding the factors that influence cost 
overruns, it was concluded that completion time and the geographical region influence cost 
overruns, whereas project type and workforce do not have an impact. Odeck (2004) argues 
that larger projects are most probably under much better management compared with smaller 
ones and this is the reason why overruns are less predominant among larger projects. As a 
possible explanation for the tendency that cost overruns are higher the shorter the completion 
time, he argues that the shorter the length of time the construction is expected to take, the 
more difficult it is to predict costs. This would imply that uncertainties diminish with time.  
Kaliba et al. (2008) carried out a study into cost escalation and schedule delays in road 
construction projects in Zambia. The main causes of cost escalation were: bad or inclement 
weather due to heavy rain and flooding, scope changes, environmental protection and 
mitigation costs, schedule delay, strikes, technical challenges, inflation and local government 
pressure. Factors that lead to cost escalation are said to include: the size of the project; project 
scope enlargement; inflation; length of time to complete the project; incompleteness of 
preliminary engineering and quantity surveys; engineering uncertainties; exogenous delays; 
complex administrative structures; and inexperienced administrative personnel (Merewitz, 
1973). Cost escalation is further compounded by factors such as project location, project 
conditions, environmental mitigation costs, suspension of work, strikes, poor site 
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coordination, expiry of bid, local government pressure, political discontinuity and 
transportation problems (Hall, 1980; NAP, 2003; Schexnayder, 2003).  
 
Studies with a broad focus 
Hall (1980) conducted one of the first empirical studies with a broad focus on inadequate 
planning of large infrastructure projects incorporating cost overruns. The research starts with 
the notion that many of the planning disasters seem to have been initiated on the basis of 
forecasts that were later found to be inadequate and misleading. Searching for a better 
understanding of the failures in planning, Hall (1980) considers planning uncertainty to be an 
important element and makes a distinction between three categories of uncertainty. They are: 
uncertainty in the planning environment, uncertainty in related decision areas and uncertainty 
about value judgments (see: Hall, 1980, for an elaboration on these types of uncertainty). He 
further considers whether the difference between public and private goods has any effect on 
the planning failures. According to Hall (1980), the main problem is the way in which 
societies plan the output of the public good (goods and services which the public is willing to 
pay for but which the private sector is not motivated to provide (Hall, 1980)). Public goods 
are characterised by non-exclusiveness and non-control over exclusion (Snidal, 1979). 
Suppliers of the public good do not have the opportunity not to provide the good (non-
exclusiveness). This difference between public and private goods is particularly important in 
the research on cost overruns.    
Mackie and Preston (1998) present twenty-one sources of error and bias in the appraisal of 
transport projects. They mainly relate to measurement error and appraisal optimism. They 
conclude that appraisal optimism is the greatest danger in transport investment analysis. 
‘Appraisal optimism happens because the information contained in the appraisal tends to be 
owned by scheme promoters who have obvious incentives to bias the appraisal - deliberately 
or unwittingly’.  
Another study that incorporates a wider scope is the research of Bruzelius et al. (2002) 
who find that differences between forecasts and actual costs, revenues and viability could not 
be explained by the difficulty of forecasting itself. These differences can only be explained 
by the strategic behaviour of project proponents who succeed in biasing forecasts in such a 
way that it leads to the decision to continue with the project instead of to change plans. Three 
issues are mentioned in this respect: the lack of a long-term commitment to the project, rent-
seeking behaviour for special interest groups, and the tendency to underestimate in tenders in 
order to get proposals accepted.  
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Research by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) focuses on the new politics of infrastructure 
development and distinguishes four political eras. One of the main important conclusions of 
the research relevant here is the following notion: ‘consistent underestimation is an example 
of the tragedy of the commons. It corrodes the public confidence in government overall, and 
especially in proposals with long time frames, even as it helps advance specific projects’.  
Finally, one of the leading pieces of research in the field of cost overruns in large 
transportation infrastructure projects is by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a). They examined 258 
projects worldwide, and their research identifies cost overruns for several projects. They find 
that cost overruns are the greatest for rail projects, with an average cost overrun of 45%, 
followed by fixed links (average cost overruns of 34%) and road projects (average cost 
overrun of 20%). Explanations for cost overruns are sought through statistical analysis and 
theoretical considerations. Four categories of explanations were distinguished (see for 
example Flyvbjerg et al. 2002a, Flyvbjerg 2005, Flyvbjerg et al. 2003a). First, technical 
explanations are indicated, which are forecasting errors in technical terms, including 
inadequate data and lack of experience. Second, there are economic explanations that depict 
the cost underestimation as deliberate and economically rational. Third, psychological 
explanations for cost overruns, including the concepts of planning fallacy and optimism bias, 
are provided. Fourth, political explanations might also explain cost overruns. Strategic 
misrepresentation is an important concept within political explanation.  
To obtain a better overview of the type of causes and explanations, section 4 will 
categorise these causes and explanations.    
 
Categorising causes and explanations  
Table 2 presents the causes and explanations found in the studies considered based on the 
categorisation provided by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003a). 
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Table 2. Causes and explanations 
Explanation Causes Study 
Technical  Forecasting errors including price rises, poor 
project design, and incompleteness of estimations 
Scope changes 
 
Uncertainty 
Inappropriate organisational structure 
Inadequate decision-making process 
Inadequate planning process 
Morris, Nijkamp and Ubbels,Lee, 
Fouracre, Mansfield et al., Kaliba et al., 
Mackie and Preston    
Nijkamp, Wachs, Lee, Fouracre et al., 
Kaliba 
Hall, Kaliba et al.   
Hall, Mansfield et al., Kaliba et al. 
Bruzelius et al. 
Pickrell 
Economical Deliberate underestimation due to:  
- lack of incentives,  
- lack of resources,  
- inefficient use of resources 
- dedicated funding process 
- poor financing / contract management 
- strategic behaviour 
 
Pickrell, Wachs 
Odeck, Mansfield et al. 
Hall 
Pickrell, Morris, Wachs, Bruzelius et al.  
Mansfield et al. 
Hall, Bruzelius et al.Arvan and Leite 
Psychological Optimism bias among local officials 
 
Cognitive bias of people 
Cautious attitudes towards risk 
Pickrell, Kahneman and Lovallo, 
Fouracre et al., Mackie and Preston 
Kahneman and Lovallo 
Kahneman and Lovallo 
Political Deliberate cost underestimation 
Manipulation of forecasts 
Private information 
Nijkamp, Bruzelius et al. 
Wachs, Auditor General of Sweden 
Arvan and Leite 
 
Technical explanations are commonly found in the literature on cost overruns. Price rises, 
poor project design and implementation, and incomplete estimations are all seen as the causes 
of cost overruns. Price rises are difficult to predict in the future, poor project design and 
implementation could be the result of a lack of experience, and incomplete estimates are an 
indication of inadequate data. These are considered variables that influence cost overruns, 
rather than explaining cost overruns themselves. Together with other causes, the cause is part 
of a technical explanation. Scope changes, uncertainty, inappropriate organisational structure, 
inadequate decision-making processes, and inadequate planning processes are all considered 
technical explanations for cost overruns on their own. They mainly relate to difficulties 
predicting the future and are considered ‘honest’ errors. Scope changes indicate changes in 
the design that were not predicted beforehand. These changes involve additional costs. The 
inappropriate organisational structure, the inadequate decision-making process, and the 
inadequate planning process all indicate inefficiency resulting in costs higher than expected. 
What we are looking at here are an inability to adapt sufficiently well to changing 
circumstances, accountability and control, and planning.  
The lack of incentives and resources, the dedicated funding process, and the inefficient 
planning of public outputs are considered (economic) causes because although they influence 
the extent of cost overrun, they cannot provide an explanation in themselves. Forecasters 
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often lack an incentive to provide accurate estimates and accordingly underestimate forecasts 
because it is in their own interest to do so. Due to a lack of resources, decision-makers have 
to choose between projects and this leads to competition. Consequently, project promoters 
deliberately underestimate costs in order to make projects look more attractive and thereby 
increase the chance of being selected. The inefficient use of resources can also result in cost 
overrun. Inferior projects are implemented and resources are spent that cannot be recovered. 
Lastly, the dedicated funding process results in cost overruns. Costs of projects are 
deliberately underestimated to increase the chance of receiving part of the funding. Strategic 
behaviour is an economic explanation for cost overruns on its own. Underestimating costs 
increases the chance of getting the project started. 
Psychological explanations are based on the concepts of planning fallacy and optimism 
bias. They involve peoples’ cognitive bias and their cautious attitudes towards risks When 
taking decisions. In taking decisions with risky prospects, people tend to be risk averse, have 
near-proportional risk attitudes (people are proportionally risk averse) and frame their 
decision problems narrowly (people consider decision problems one at a time, often isolating 
the current problem from other choices that may be pending, as well as from future 
opportunities to make similar decisions (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993)). The cognitive bias 
leads to optimistic forecasts resulting in cost overruns. And due to the cautious attitude 
towards risks, people frame an outcome that maximises utility. A higher utility is obtained 
when the project is selected for implementation. The chance of being selected is increased 
when the estimated costs are low, consequently leading to underestimation.  
Political explanations are generally agreed upon in the literature as the main explanation 
for cost overruns. Other explanations (sub-explanations) that fall within this overall category 
are deliberate cost underestimation and forecast manipulation. Costs are deliberately 
underestimated in order to increase the chances of project acceptance. Wachs (1989) argues 
that cost forecasts are manipulated because behaviour is determined on considerations of 
advocacy rather than objectivity. The literature furthermore describes different causes of cost 
overruns by strategic misrepresentation, including: learning, a lack of coordination, a lack of 
long-term commitment, a lack of discipline, organisational and political pressure, and 
asymmetric information. Learning involves the awareness among managers and decision-
makers that in order for projects to be selected for implementation, forecasts of outcomes 
have to be highly favourable. Consequently, they behave strategically and misrepresent 
forecasts. The lack of coordination, the lack of long-term commitment and the lack of 
discipline make strategic behaviour possible because of the lack of consequences that is 
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related to this kind of behaviour. Organisational and political pressures cause strategic 
misrepresentation because forecasts are adjusted to derive the most politically or 
organisationally attractive outcomes. Lastly, asymmetric information is an important cause of 
deliberate underestimation or strategic misrepresentation. Decision-makers have little 
information and are dependent on the information obtained from forecasts. This gives 
forecasters the opportunity to misrepresent information.  
It is recognised within this categorisation of explanations that the difference between 
economic and political explanations is rather small. Both types of explanation use utility as a 
basis to understand behaviour. However, the starting point differs. Whereas economic 
explanations reason from the lack of incentives and resources and consider this the starting 
point to strive for utility maximisation, political explanations construe this in terms of 
interests and power (Flyvbjerg, 1998). 
 
Plausibility of explanations 
The plausibility of an explanation is partly based on its theoretical embeddedness. When 
there are models, assumptions, premises or concepts behind the explanation, the likelihood of 
understanding the phenomenon of cost overruns increases.  
Table 3. Theories in explanations 
Explanation  Theory Study  Type of study 
Forecasting Kahneman and Lovallo, Wachs  
Flyvbjerg et al.  
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport 
Planning Pickrell, Altshuler and Luberoff, Hall  Narrow & transport, Broad & 
various 
Technical  
Decision-making Bruzelius et al.  Broad & transport 
Neoclassical 
economics 
Pickrell, Odeck, Wachs Narrow & transport, Narrow 
& various 
Economical 
Rational choice Hall, Flybjerg et al. Broad & various, Broad & 
transport 
Planning fallacy & 
optimism bias 
Kahneman and Lovallo, Pickrell, 
Flyvbjerg et al., Fouracre et al., Mackie 
and Preston 
Narrow & various, Narrow & 
transportation, Broad & 
transport, Narrow &Transport 
Prospect  Kahneman and Lovallo, Flyvbjerg et 
al.  
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport  
Psychological 
Rational choice Kahneman and Lovallo  Narrow & various 
Machiavellianism Flyvbjerg et al., Bruzelius et al., Hall, 
Wachs, Morris, Pickrell , Nijkamp and 
Ubbels, Odeck 
Broad & transport, Broad & 
various, Narrow & various, 
Narrow & transport   
Agency Wachs, Flyvbjerg et al., Arvan and 
Leite  
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport, Narrow & various 
Political 
Ethical Wachs, Flyvbjerg et al., Auditor 
General of Sweden 
Narrow & various, Broad & 
transport, Narrow and 
transport 
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Table 3 shows that a large variety of theories is used to support explanations. Theories are 
evenly distributed among studies.  
 
Technical explanations 
Three theories were used to support technical explanations: forecasting theory, planning 
theory and decision-making theory. Forecasting theory examines estimations in uncertain 
future situations. It studies the understanding of the forecasting process at large and aims to 
clarify how and why the various successes and failures come about (Armstrong, 2001). 
Failures in estimates may arise as a result of the cognitive mind in the forecasting process. 
Forecasting models were used to gain a better understanding of the problems with errors in 
forecasting techniques or inappropriate forecasting approaches that lead to poor cost 
estimates. Planning theory examines how projects and policy are established (Faludi, 1973). 
Planning concepts were used to refer to the inappropriate planning process of projects and the 
poor design and implementation as a main explanation for cost overruns. Lastly, decision-
making theory considers government and politics as a series of decisions taken by people and 
institutions that make rational decisions in the light of their interests and the circumstances 
under which they operate (Dunleavy, 1991). This is mainly seen when it is referred to 
inappropriate institutional arrangements as a reason for cost overruns. The three theories are 
rather different and can be useful to address different parts of the explanation.  
 
Economic explanations 
Economic explanations were mainly founded on neoclassical economics and rational choice 
theory. Neoclassical economics is a framework for understanding the allocation of scarce 
resources among alternative ends. It sees that incentives and costs play an important role in 
shaping decision making. These notions of incentives in decision making are used in relation 
to cost overruns as follows: ‘The dedicated funding causes little incentive to produce accurate 
figures because accurate figures decrease the chance of receiving part of the funding‘ 
(Pickrell, 1992). The premises of neoclassical economics are also used to find an explanation 
for the tendency to deliberately misrepresent information. This is explained by the lack of 
incentives for the planners in their role as ‘advocates’. Rational choice theory aims to 
understand social and economic behaviour. It assumes that the actions of individuals are 
fundamentally rational and people calculate the costs and benefits of an action, recognising 
their preference functions and constraints facing them before taking a decision (Arrow, 1987; 
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Coleman, 1992). The theory is used to underlie the explanation that it is economically 
rational to underestimate costs because it will increase the likelihood of revenue and profit. 
Rational choice theory is considered to have considerable potential in explaining cost 
overruns, not only for economic explanations but also for psychological and political 
explanations. For political explanations, it has important implications for the relation between 
the agent and the principal. The theory assumes that individuals choose the best action 
according to stable preference functions and the constraints facing them. When making a 
decision, the agent searches for the best action according to his preferences, taking the 
interests of the principal into account. This might lead to conflicts surrounding the cost 
estimates.  
 
Psychological explanations 
Psychological explanations are addressed by a small number of studies and are based on the 
concepts of planning fallacy and optimism bias, prospect theory and rational choice theory. 
Planning fallacy is used as follows: ‘it is the tendency to underestimate time, costs and risks 
of future actions and at the same time overestimate the benefits of the same actions’. 
Cognitive biases of forecasters such as scenario thinking, anchoring estimations and 
extrapolation of current trends result in optimism bias, the systematic tendency to be overly 
optimistic. Prospect theory (which is part of psychological theory) is used to explain that the 
optimistic forecasts are a result of decision-making involving uncertainties and risk. The 
explanation of cost overruns based on risks can also be founded by rational choice theory 
which assumes that in their consideration people take risk into account in their goal of utility 
maximisation.  
The concept of planning fallacy and optimism bias are closely related, but because the link 
with cost overruns is stronger for optimism bias, the preference is given to this notion to 
support psychological explanations. Prospect theory is preferred even more so because it 
provides a more comprehensive model for psychological explanations incorporating 
uncertainty and risks in addition to optimistic forecasts. Lastly, rational choice theory is 
considered a very useful basis for understanding cost overruns because it addresses 
economic, political and psychological elements of the phenomenon.   
 
Political explanations 
Three theories underlie political explanations: the concept of Machiavellianism, agency 
theory, and ethical theory. Strategic misrepresentation is the core issue in political 
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explanations and this is underlined by the concept of Machiavellianism. This is the person’s 
tendency to deceive and manipulate others for personal gain (Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Christie 
& Geis, 1970). The concept is often used to explain cost overruns as a result of competition 
among parties for government funding or to get projects going. Strategic behaviour is enabled 
because ‘uncertainties of estimates are never brought to the attention of decision-makers’ 
(Odeck, 2004). Similarly, cost overruns can be considered the result of the decision-making 
process involving many actors with different interests acting strategically (possibly involving 
‘lying’) leading to sub-optimal results. One theory that also incorporates the notion of 
manipulation is ethical theory, which studies the behaviour of people and groups and includes 
their values, customs and responsibility (Wachs, 1982; LaFolette, 2000). Costs are 
underestimated because of a lack of loyalty or responsibility to the agent or to a the lack of 
values in a forecaster’s mind to produce accurate figures. Lastly, agency theory is also often 
used to address the strategic behaviour in political explanations. Agency theory (principal 
agent theory) assumes that people act unreservedly in their own narrowly defined self-interest 
with, if necessary, guile and deceit (Noreen, 1999). Agency theory can explain why strategic 
behaviour is made possible by the concept of asymmetric information. It is also used in the 
context of possible institutional set-ups between parties to guide the decision-making on 
projects. The asymmetric information makes it possible for an agent to take strategic 
advantage of the set-up of the funding process to deliberately under-budget their projects in 
order to see them realised. 
Ethical theory is rather specific and its contribution to a full understanding of cost 
overruns is considered to be small due to its weak relationship with cost overruns. The 
contribution of the concept of Machiavellianism is mainly related to the manipulation 
element but this is also incorporated in agency theory by assuming agents act, if necessary, 
with deceit. Agency theory is therefore held to be the most comprehensive theory. It is 
considered promising in bringing about a more general understanding of the phenomenon of 
cost overruns because it can also underlie economic explanations. The relationship between 
the agent and the principal is characterised by the utility maximising behaviour of agents, 
hence, the link with the economic causes of cost overruns. 
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Conclusions and recommendations  
This paper provides an overview of the different explanations for cost overruns; the most 
commonly used explanations are: economic rational behaviour, strategic behaviour, optimism 
bias, structure of the organisation, relationship between actors and actors’ values and their 
relationship to the environment. The explanations can be grouped into four different 
categories: technical explanations, economic explanations, psychological explanations, and 
political explanations. In addition, the theoretical embeddedness of the explanations was 
investigated. The extent of the use and the variety of theories used in the literature is actually 
quite large. Table 4 indicates which theories are considered most appropriate to support the 
explanations for cost overruns for each category of explanations. 
Table 4. Appropriate theories for explaining cost overruns 
Sub-category of explanations Appropriate theories 
 Political explanations  Machiavellianism 
 Agency theory 
 Technical explanations  Forecasting theory 
 Planning theory 
 Economic explanations  Neoclassical economics 
 Rational choice theory 
 Psychological explanations  Prospect theory 
 Rational choice theory 
 
Considering the wide variety of explanations and theories, we recommend focusing on the 
type of explanation before applying a specific theory to better understand the cost overruns in 
projects. Each type of explanation requires the use of a different theory to understand the way 
in which cost overruns appeared. Political explanations are the most dominant and agency 
theory (principal-agent theory specifically) is therefore recommended as a basic theory to 
understand cost overruns. Agency theory is considered to be the most interesting for the 
following reasons. First, it is rather specific, and can address cost overruns specifically. 
Secondly, an initial attempt to use the theory to understand cost overruns has already been 
made indicating its relevance. And lastly, the theory makes use of several disciplines, 
including politics, economics and sociology, which makes the theory fairly complete. 
However, although agency theory is quite comprehensive, it is to be expected that there may 
be aspects that cannot be addressed appropriately by agency theory. It might not be the all-
embracing theory that can be applied to understand and explain cost overruns by political 
theories. If that is true, an eclectic theory needs to be defined that is based on agency theory 
but also includes the ‘best’ insights of other theories. Therefore, the recommendation is to 
search for other promising theories that can help bring about a better understanding of cost 
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overruns. Theories in the fields of political science, economics or institutions are considered 
useful. In addition, research into the explanations of cost underestimation with respect to 
contingencies and explanations regarding demand forecasts is considered valuable. 
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